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The American Influence on the
Development of Canadian
Commercial Law*
Jacob S. Ziegelt
American influence on Canadian law was minimal during the early stages
of Canadian history, but became more pronounced as Canada became
progressively commercialized and industrialized. The author explores
the extent of this American influence, focuses on the Canadian reaction
to the different articles of the Uniform Commercial Code, and notes that
Canadians are most receptive to legal imports when their domestic law
either supplies no answers or is seriously inadequate in the face of chang-
ing conditions. He further hypothesizes that the Canadian response to the
Uniform Commercial Credit Code will exhibit the same inquiries that
were made when consideration was given to the articles of the Uniform
Commercial Code.
I. INTRODUCTION
The subject which has been assigned to me for discussion is
of such magnitude that I am overwhelmed by my sponsor's gener-
osity. Admittedly, commercial law is not a term of art and reason-
able men may disagree where its boundaries should be drawn.
But even its common core-the core that any self-respecting text on
commercial law would embrace-would tax my ingenuity and, I
fear, display an all too obvious ignorance. My difficulties are ag-
gravated because Canadian legal history as an intellectual discipline
is still in its infancy1 and serious study of the evolution of our
commercial law is largely conspicuous by its absence. Where so
much is still virgin territory it would be presumptuous for me to play
the part of a Columbus.
*This paper is the slightly revised version of a public lecture delivered at the
Case Western Reserve University School of Law on April 9, 1975 as part of the
newly created Distinguished Law Lectures and Mini-Seminar Series.
tProfessor of Law, University of Toronto. LL.B., LL.M., Ph.D. (1962), Univer-
sity of London. Member of the English and Ontario Bars. Professor Ziegel is a
well-known Canadian author on commercial and consumer law subjects and has
been active for a number of years in helping to modernize the Canadian law. He
is chairman of the Committee of the Canadian Bar Association on a Model Uni-
form Personal Property Security Act and research director of the Sale of Goods
Project of the Ontario Law Reform Commission.
1. P. Maddaugh, Bibliography of Canadian Legal History, February, 1972
(Mimeo., York University Law Library); Flaherty, The Prospectus for Canadian
Legal History, 8 LSUL GAz. 199 (1974); Risk, A Prospectus for Canadian Legal
History, 1 DALHousia L.J. 227 (1973).
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I hope therefore I may be forgiven if I walk a much more
eclectic path. I propose to use as my compass some of the better
known articles of the Uniform Commercial Code. This will in-
volve the exclusion of almost all aspects of corporate and security
law, an omission that I particularly regret because these are areas
in which the American influence has been particularly pro-
nounced.2 If I am restrictive at this end of the spectrum I fear
I may be guilty of offending at the other, for I hope to include
in my remarks some observations on the comparative development
of Canadian and American consumer credit laws. I adopt this
expansive view of the scope of my subject for a number of reasons.
The most selfish one is that it coincides with a professional interest
which I have attempted to cultivate for a number of years. A more
respectable reason is that the astonishing growth of consumer credit
in the post-war period both north and south of the border provides
a particularly instructive example of the way our respective juris-
dictions have sought to resolve essentially common problems.
A distant observer, blissfully ignorant of the complexities of
the actual picture, might be forgiven for assuming that Canadian
commercial law is essentially a replica of its powerful neighbour
to the south. On the face of it the assumption makes sense. We
speak the same language, we have a common legal heritage, and
the Elvis Presleys and their ilk gyrate as merrily on Canadian T.V.
screens as they do on American sets. American investment plays
a critical role in the Canadian economy and many of our best known
companies are wholly or substantially owned by American inves-
tors.3 No less significant, we are each other's most important trad-
ing partner. About a fifth of all American exports go to Canada,
which reciprocates with more than 60 percent of its own.4 It would
be natural, therefore, to assume the existence of a common law
merchant.
2. This influence is illustrated by the Canada Business Corporations Act,
23 & 24 Eliz. 2, c. 33 (1974-1975); The Ontario Business Corporations Act, ONT. REv.
STAT. c. 53 (1970); The Ontario Securities Act, ONT. REV. STAr. c. 426 (1970).
See generally 2 STUDIES IN CANADIAN COMPANY LAW: CORPORATION AND
SECURITIES LAW IN THE SEVENTIES (J. Ziegel ed. 1973).
3. See GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CANADA
(1972); ONTARIO INTER-DEPARTMENTAL TASK FORCE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
REPORT (1971); TASK FORCE ON THE STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY, FOR-
EIGN OWNERSHIP AND THE STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY (1968). See
also The Foreign Investment Review Act, CAN. STAT. c. 46 (1973); Grover, The
Foreign Investment Review Act: Phase 1, 1 CANADIAN BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
[CAN. Bus. L.J.] 54 (1975).
4. 55 BUR. OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF
CURRENT BUSINESS 5-23 (1975); 50 CANADIAN STATISTICAL REVIEW [CAN.
STATIS. REV.] § 11 (1975) (Tables 1, 2).
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And yet our observer is profoundly mistaken. Canadian com-
mercial law is far from being a carbon copy of American law or,
for that matter, any other country's law. Our commercial law is a
mosaic which reflects a variety of influences-English, French,
and American-on which there is superimposed an increasingly im-
portant indigenous element. Had Canada started its legal and po-
litical career on a blank sheet, as it were, had we suddenly been
transported from the ice age into the wonders of the North Ameri-
can industrial age, the result might well have been different. But,
of course, our origins were very different.
Cast your mind back to 1867, the year in which the British
North America Act, Canada's founding charter, was adopted.5
Our population was only 3 1/2 million 6 and it was scattered among
a handful of self-governing colonies stretching across a vast land
mass from Prince Edward Island off the East Coast to Vancouver
Island in the West. There was little manufacturing industry, and
agriculture and the forests provided the most common forms of
livelihood.7 Politically and legally our ties were overwhelmingly
with the United Kingdom,8 which also supplied much of the capital
and the manpower for the development of the Canadian economy.
Canada evolved to modern nationhood over a period of fifty years
and, unlike the U.S., there was never any disposition or need to
disregard our cultural heritage and to fashion new concepts or insti-
tutions on a massive scale.9 It is not then surprising that the foun-
dations of Canadian commercial law are solidly anchored in British
precedents.
I must mention quickly a number of other factors that explain
the preponderant transatlantic influence and the modest role of
American law during this formative phase of Canadian commercial
law. Britain was at the height of her industrial and commercial
power. Her commercial laws developed rapidly during the second
half of the 19th century, so much so that the time was deemed ripe
for a series of codifications as influential in their day as the Uni-
form Commercial Code promises to be in ours. Witness such im-
portant landmarks as the Bills of Exchange Act, 0 adopted in 1882,
5. The British North America Act, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (1867). The Act has
since been amended on a substantial number of occasions.
6. HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF CANADA, (Series Al, M. Urquhart & K.
Buckley eds. 1965).
7. Id. series F, at 246-69.
8. Cf. B. LASKIN, THE BRITISH TRADITION IN CANADIAN LAW (1969).
9. Cf. R. DAWSON, THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA (4th ed. 1963). Note in
particular the discussion in chapter 3.
10. 45 & 46 Vict., c. 61 (1882).
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the Partnership Act," adopted in 1890, the Sale of Goods Act,' 2
adopted in 1893, and the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894.13 These
major initiatives were accompanied by a great deal of ancillary
legislation, such as the Factors Act 188914 and the Mercantile Law
Amendment Act,15 much of which was also reproduced in Canada.
In contrast, the law of the American states was far from being settled
and presented a bewildering array of often conflicting answers to
common problems.
Two other factors, indigenous to Canada's position, also mili-
tated against the simple absorption of American influence. One
was the structure of the Canadian constitution; the other was the
civil law heritage of the Province of Quebec. In the British North
America Act the constitutional responsibility over the major areas
of commercial law is much more clearly divided between the fed-
eral and provincial governments than it is between Congress and
the states in the American constitution. In consequence the federal
government in Canada has tended to play a more active role in this
branch of the law than its counterpart in the U.S., though this dif-
ference has probably diminished considerably in the postwar period.
The British North America Act assigns exclusive jurisdiction to the
federal government over such important subjects as navigation and
shipping,16 banks and banking, 7 bills of exchange and promissory
notes, 8 interest, 9 bankruptcy and insolvency, 20 and interprovincial
works and undertakings. 2' For good measure the federal govern-
ment also enjoys legislative power over such amorphous areas as
2 23trade and commerce22 and criminal law and procedure, as well
as a residuary power under the embarrassingly vague peace, order
24and good government clause. It will be seen, therefore, that there
are few if indeed any commercial law areas into which the federal
government could not inject its presence. Until now it has shown
little disposition to monopolize the field and, for the most part,
11. 53 & 54 Vict., c. 39 (1890).
12. 56 & 57 Vict., c. 71 (1893).
13. 57 & 58 Vict., c. 60 (1894).
14. 52 & 53 Vict., c. 45 (1889).
15. 19 & 20 Vict., c. 97 (1956).
16. The British North America Act, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 91, at 10 (1867).
17. Id. at 15.
18. Id. at 18.
19. Id. at 19.
20. Id. at 21.
21. Id. § 92, at 10(a).
22. Id. § 91, at 2.
23. Id. at 27.
24. Id. at preamble.
25. Id. § 92, at 13.
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has been quite content to share it with the provinces whose jurisdic-
tion is derived almost exclusively under their "property and civil
rights" power.25 Given this duality of sources and jurisdictions, a
simple osmosis of foreign influences would have been more acci-
dental than planned.
Quebec's position is sui generis. Quebec has no constitutional
prerogative to legislate in the commercial law area that is not shared
by the other provinces. It does, however, have a strong and abid-
ing loyalty to the principles of French civil law as reflected in
its Civil Code.26 Admittedly, it has no separate code de commerce
but this means simply that those areas of commercial law over
which the province has jurisdiction have been incorporated in the
Civil Code. I do not mean to suggest that the common law
has played no role in shaping the character of Quebec's commercial
law. It has.2' Almost from the beginning the Quebec courts,
and later the draftsmen of the Civil Code, borrowed from common
law judicial and legislative precedents where French law was silent
or where its rules seemed inappropriate in a North American con-
text. But this is an important story of its own which deserves to
be related by hands much more competent than mine. All I wish
to emphasize is that in viewing the Canadian mosaic we bear in
mind the important role played in it by the civil law component that
is Quebec.
II. THREE PHASES OF AMERICAN INFLUENCE
If I have carried you with me so far you may begin to wonder,
perhaps even to despair, if and when the American influence began
to emerge. Like Gaul, it seems to me that from a historical per-
spective the subject can be divided into three fairly recognizable
periods. The first stretches from the early 19th century to the First
World War. The second from approximately 1914 until the end of
the Second World War. The third period, the present, covers the
years since 1945.
I have already suggested the minor role which American legal
26. The Civil Code was first adopted in 1866 and is currently in the final
phases of a complete revision by the Civil Code Revision Office under the chairman-
ship of Prof. P. A. Cr~pean of McGill University. See generally, J. G. CASTEL,
THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM OF THE PROVINCE OF QUEBEC (1962).
27. See CIVIL CODE OF THE PROVINCE OF QUEBEC Bk. III, tit. 5-16, Bk. IV
(1968). See generally A. PERRAULT, TRAnTE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL (3 vols.
1936-40).
28. Cf. Falconbridge, The Bills of Exchange Act in Quebec, 20 CANADIAN
BAR REVIEW [CAN. B. REV.] 723, 726 (1942); Nicholls, Book Review, 15 Id. 733,
735 (1937).
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concepts and legislation apparently played during the first period.
Perhaps it could more accurately be described as an interstitial
role. Undoubtedly it existed, though the precise extent of its in-
fluence is buried in government archives and other less accessible
sources. Until the legal historian comes to our assistance I can
only illustrate with a few examples. The characters of Canada's
first banks-particularly that of Canada's oldest surviving bank, the
Bank of Montreal-borrowed heavily from the charter of the first
Bank of the United States, said to have been prepared by Alexander
Hamilton.29 Canada's banking system differs today in fundamental
respects from the American system30 but, to quote the author of a
standard text, "even in the present Bank Act a number of features
of Hamilton's charter may still be recognized."'" American influ-
ence again manifested itself in the first general banking act of 1850
of the Province of Canada which was modelled on the lines of the
free banking laws of the State of New York and was designed to
encourage the easier incorporation of banks.
3 2
New York was also an important source of precedents in at
least two other areas. As in the United Kingdom, keen controversy
surrounded the desirability of allowing easy incorporation for gen-
eral business enterprises. When the critical breakthroughs came
in a series of general incorporation statutes, that of 1850 permitting
incorporation of manufacturing and mining enterprises was based
on a New York counterpart.33 I shall have much more to say pres-
ently about the influence of American chattel security law, particu-
larly Article 9, on the contemporary Canadian scene. For the mo-
ment it will suffice to note some early- influences. Ontario's first
Conditional Sales Act of 188914 with its marking provisions35 as a
means of providing notice of absentee ownership and the blissfully
domestic exceptions in favour of household furniture other than
pianos, organs and other musical instruments, was apparently based,
at least in part, on a contemporary New York statute.36 The term
29. A. B. JAMIESON, CHARTERED BANKING IN CANADA 3-4 (1962).
30. See J. A. GALBRAITH, CANADIAN BANKING (1971); A. B. JAMIESON,
supra note 29, at chapt. X (1962); E. NEUFELD, MONEY AND BANKING IN CANADA:
HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY (1964).
31. A.B. JAMIESON, supra note 29, at 4.
32. Id. at 6, 7.
33. Risk, The 19th Century Foundations of the Business Corporation in On-
tario, 23 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL [U. TOR. L.J.] 270, 277 (1973).
34. STAT. ONT. C. 19 (1889).
35. Id. § 6.
36. See 4 N.Y. REV. STAT. § 4 et seq. (1889). However, the New York and
Ontario provisions were not identical. According to my colleague, Prof. R. C. B.
Risk, there is no authoritative guide to the source of Ontario legislation of the
period, but based on the similarity of the legislation in question and on newspaper
[Vol. 26:861
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lien note, in common use throughout the prairie provinces, 7 was
also an American borrowing and through its draftsman's attempt
to combine the features of a negotiable promise with the elements
of chattel security (the modem chattel paper) provided a fertile
source of litigation for about a quarter of a century.
3 8
American influence during the interwar period became much
more pronounced, much more visible, and in a sense much more
institutionalized. The Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity
of Legislation in Canada39 was established in 1918 and, to this
day, its goals and constitution resemble closely those of its Ameri-
can parent.40  The Canadian Commissioners early focused their at-
tention on the commercial law scene. The first Uniform Bulk
Sales Act adopted in 1920 and, in particular, the Conditional Sales
Act adopted in 1922, bear conscious marks of their American origins
though they were not, I hasten to add, simple copies of their proto-
types.4' A still more striking example of hemispheric influence
was the Small Loans Act adopted by the federal Parliament in
1939,42 which was largely based on the sixth draft of the Uniform
Small Loan Law.43 American influence also clearly manifested
itself in the developing corporation laws. This was true of the
earliest Canadian Blue Sky laws,44 with their emphasis on disclosure
and the establishment of a supervisory regime, and equally of the
introduction of no par value shares and the largely ineffectual at-
tempts to prevent share watering.4 5
So we reach what I venture to predict future historians will de-
scribe as the golden age of American influence. Just as continen-
reports of legislative debates, he is satisfied that New York was a fertile source of
precedents for Ontario in the corporate and commercial law areas.
37. See, e.g., Killoran v. Monticello State Bank, 16 Alta. 341 (Alberta App.
Div. 1920), affid, 61 Can. S. Ct. 528 (1921).
38. Hogg, The Lien Note, 2 CAN. B. REv. 491 (1924); Read, Negotiability as
it Affects Lien Notes, 5 Id. 314 (1927). The Canadian treatment of consumer notes
and the holder in due course predicament is discussed at the text accompanying
notes 129-37 infra.
39. Now renamed the Uniform Law Conference of Canada.
40. See Palmer, Federalism and Uniformity of Laws: the Canadian Experience,
30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 250 (1965); Ryan & Lehoux, The Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada, in UNIFORM LAW CONFERENCE
OF CANADA, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 53RD ANNUAL MEETING 414 (1971).
41. See Ziegel, Uniformity of Legislation in Canada-the Conditional Sales
Experience, 39 CAN. B. REV. 165 (1961).
42. See CAN. REV. STAT. c. 5-11 (1970).
43. See Ziegel, Retail Instalment Sales Legislation: A Historical and Compar-
ative Study, 14 U. TOR. L.J. 143, 153 (1962).
44. J. P. WILLIAMSON, SECURITIES REGULATION IN CANADA ch. 7A (1960).
45. Cf. W. FRASER & J. STEWART, COMPANY LAW OF CANADA 184 et seq.
(5th ed. 1962); Fraser, No Par Shares, 7 CAN. B. REV. 84 (1929).
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tal Europe emerging from the confining fetters of the Middle Ages
felt the need for the absorption of new principles and a more criti-
cal look at its legal system in the light of rapidly changing condi-
tions, so Canada was faced in the post-World War II period with
an infinitely more complex industrial and social society than before
the war. Our industry expanded rapidly during the war and, with
the influx of large numbers of immigrants in the forties, fifties
and sixties, coupled with a high birth rate, Canada's population
figure showed equally impressive growth. For better or ill, the
pendulum swung decisively in favour of a predominantly urbanized
society. Our financial markets came of age and consumer credit
burgeoned at an astonishing rate.
In an earlier era the United Kingdom might have been able to
supply the legal resources to enable the Dominion to cope with
the congeries of new problems. But conditions had changed.
Greatly weakened by the exertions of war, the United Kingdom lay
prostrate. The British Empire was rapidly being converted into a
much more loosely knit association of fully autonomous Common-
wealth states. The mother country was no longer the cynosure of
legal developments, certainly not in the commercial sphere and pos-
sibly not in others. The mantle of legal leadership had clearly
fallen on Uncle Sam and Uncle Sam was ready to assume it with
bold new doctrinal strokes, masterful forms of codification, and a
plethora of innovative legislative measures in the corporate, com-
mercial, and consumer areas. Canada was the most immediate
and still remains the single largest beneficiary of this shift in direc-
tion. The influence has been so pervasive that the narrator is con-
fronted with an embarrassment of riches. A long citation of exam-
ples would accomplish little except to provoke boredom. I shall
therefore focus on the influence of the Uniform Commercial Code
on Canadian law and the interaction of Canadian and American
legal developments in the consumer credit area.
III. THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
It is no longer sensible to ask whether the Uniform Commercial
Code has left its legacy on Canadian law. The answer is clearly
yes. The Ontario46 and Manitoba Personal Property Security Acts47
are closely modelled on Article 9 and so is the Model Uniform Per-
sonal Property Security Act adopted by the Canadian Bar Associa-
tion in 1970.48 The influence of Article 8 is clearly reflected in the
46. ONT. REv. STAT. c. 344 (1970).
47. MAN. STAT. c. 5 (1973).
48. See Ziegel, The Model Uniform Personal Property Security Act, 78
[Vol. 26:861
CANADIAN COMMERCIAL LAW
Ontario Business Corporations Act 197049 and the recently adopted
Canada Business Corporations Act. 50  In 1972 the Ontario Law Re-
form Commission embarked on an intensive study of the provin-
cial Sale of Goods Act with a view to recommending desirable
changes in the Act. It is an open secret that Article 2 has played a
focal role in the deliberations of the group of law teachers and
others entrusted by the Commission with the detailed research
functions. 5 1 Having regard to these developments, it is more illumi-
nating to ask a series of new questions than to regurgitate the
old. The questions that will occur to the reader are whether the
transplants have been successful, what problems were encountered
in the operation, and what are the prospects for the transplanting
of the other Articles of the Code.
A. The Experience with Article 9
It is premature to pass final judgment on the first two ques-
tions, but the data is sufficiently rich to admit of at least some tenta-
tive answers. Secured and unsecured lending for medium and
short term purposes and the sale of goods of all types on credit
is as important in Canada and as well entrenched as it is in the
United States. In 1974 the value of general loans made by the
Canadian chartered banks amounted to $35 billion. 2 The balance
outstanding on consumer credit extended by vendors and lenders
(including the banks) reached the impressive figure of $20.6 bil-
lion. 3 Much of this business and consumer credit is secured by
some form of collateral in personal property, both tangible and in-
tangible, nonpossessory as well as possessory.
Canadian chattel security law has a rich and complex history
which shares important features with pre-Code American law but
differs from it in other respects. 54  Before the advent of the new
CANADIAN BANKER [CAN. BANKER] 16 (1971). The same is true of the recom-
mendations for the enactment of personal property security legislation made re-
cently in British Columbia and Saskatchewan. See LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF
BRITISH COLUMBIA REPORT ON DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONSHIPS (PROJECT No.
2), Part V Personal Property Security (LCR 23, 1975) and LAW REFORM COMMIS-
SION OF SASKATCHEWAN, TENTATIVE PROPOSALS FOR A SASKATCHEWAN PER-
SONAL PROPERTY SECURITY ACT (March 1976).
49. ONT. REV. STAT. c. 53 (1970).
50. 23 & 24 Eliz. 2 c. 33 (1975). The final version was assented to on March
24, 1975.
51. The author is serving as research director of the project. The views ex-
pressed in this article are his own and are not to be ascribed to the Commission or
any other Canadian governmental agency.
52. BANK OF CANADA REVIEW, Sept. 1975, Table 10.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., CANADIAN CHATTEL SECURITY LAW: PAST EXPERIENCE AND
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legislation Canadian law suffered from the same proliferation of com-
mon law, equitable, and statutory security devices, each designed
to accomplish substantially the same goals but differing signifi-
cantly in detail and the intensity and scope of statutory regulation.
We also believed in using registration requirements as the principal
vehicle for perfecting security interests and giving notice of their
existence to the world where perfection by possession is not pos-
sible or practicable.
At the other end of the spectrum, Canadian pre-PPSA doc-
trine was much more generous than American law in allowing the
contracting parties freedom to shape their security agreement
pretty much as they saw fit. Following the decision of the House
of Lords in Holroyd v. Marshall,55 after-acquired property clauses
were freely recognized with respect to all forms of collateral. Our
conception of the floating charge was copied from English, not
American, law and we never fell heir to the rule in Benedict v.
Ratner56 nor to the intimidatingly complex fraudulent preference
rules in section 60(a) of the American Bankruptcy Act." In
inventory financing the right to follow proceeds was early recog-
nized, even without the aid of a Trust Receipts Act. Finally but
not least, federal law has exerted a much greater influence on the
development of chattel security law in the Canadian system than it
has in the American.18  The chattel security provisions in the fed-
eral Bank Act59 have a continuous history dating back to 1859 and
one section in particular, section 88, has been the object of ful-
some praise by successive generations of bankers because of its lib-
erality, simplicity, and sound pragmatism.
So it will be seen that what appealed about Article 9 to Cana-
dian practitioners and scholars was not its liberality. In large mea-
sure we had that already. What was most attractive was its com-
prehensiveness, its absence of useless formalities, and above all the
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS, SECURITY OVER CORPOREAL MOVEABLES ch. 5 (J. G.
Sauveplanne ed. 1974); Lee, Secured Financing in Canada, 8 ALBERTA LAW RE-
VIEW [ALTA. L. REV.] 389 (1970).
55. 10 H.L.C. 191, 11 Eng. Rep. 999 (H.L. 1862).
56. 268 U.S. 353 (1925). Benedict held void an assignment by a corporation
of its present and future accounts made more than four months before it was ad-
judged bankrupt, where the transferor was at liberty to use the accounts collected
to conduct business after the transaction in the same way as he had before the
assignment.
57. 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1970).
58. See CANADIAN CHATTEL SECURITY LAW, supra note 54, at 81.
59. CAN. REV. STAT. c. B-i, §§ 82-90 (1970); cf. A. B. JAMIESON, supra note
30, at 11 et seq., 244-80; ANSTIE, The Historical Development of Pledge Lending in
Canada, 74 CAN. BANKER (1966); 75 Id. 35 (1967).
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substitution of a single concept, the security interest, for the bewil-
dering array of security devices, each with its own complex body
of rules, provided by existing Canadian law.
At any rate this was the reaction of the Ontario committee
chaired by Fred M. Catzman, a distinguished Toronto practitioner,
when it embarked as far back as 1960 on its task of revising Ontario's
four principal registration acts in the chattel security field. 60  The
rest is now legal history. The committee produced a draft bill in
1964 and this, after some amendments by the newly created On-
tario Law Reform Commission, was finally enacted in 1967.61 It
is embarrassing to have to admit that most of the Act has not yet
been proclaimed. The evil genius responsible for this unconscion-
able delay is the computer, though I dare say that bureaucratic
confusion has also contributed its fair measure. The Act with its
new computer hardware and all-encompassing central registry was
supposed to have been proclaimed in 1974. The latest predictions
are that, barring new unforeseen difficulties, the registry will be
fully operational by the end of 1975.62
Aside from these practical differences a number of other fea-
tures, good as well as bad, distinguish the Ontario Act from its
Code counterpart. On the negative side, the members of the Catz-
man committee were divided on the merits of notice filing63 and
the enacted bill only permitted it for limited types of inventory fi-
64
nancing. Fortunately the requirements of a computerized registry
system have made the debate academic and, as the result of a 1973
amendment,65 notice filing will be the required form of filing in all
cases. However, what has sensibly been conceded with the right
hand has been illogically withdrawn by the left because the
amended section 47 of the Ontario Act also provides that the finan-
cing statement shall not be registered before the execution of the
security agreement or after thirty days from the date of its execu-
66tion. We see here a recurring phenomenon. Old habits die hard.
The Ontario practitioner has for so long been accustomed to a
time filing requirement that he feels uneasy about abandoning this
60. See Ziegel, The Draft Ontario Personal Property Security Act, 44 CAN.
B. REV. 104, 107-09 (1966); Symposium, Chattel Security: Order out of Chaos, 7
CANADIAN BAR JOURNAL [CAN. B.J.] 278 (1964).
61. ONT. STAT. c. 73 (1967), re-enacted as ONT. REv. STAT. c. 344 (1970),
amended by ONT. STAT. 1973, c. 102.
62. The forecast was slightly too optimistic. The Act was proclaimed to come
into effect on April 1, 1976.
63. See Ziegel, supra note 60, at 124.
64. ONT. REV. STAT. c. 344, § 47(2) (1970).
65. ONT. STAT. c. 102, § 9 (1973).
66. ONT. REV. STAT. c. 344, §§ 47(4), (5) (1970).
1976]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
familiar landmark in provincial chattel security law. Paradoxically,
the Ontario Act contains no time requirements with respect to
perfection of a security interest by possession.67 Hopefully this
anomaly will be resolved in due course.
A more serious anomaly involves the exclusion from the Ontario
Act of those secured transactions governed by the Corporation
Security Registration Act.68 The exception was introduced under
somewhat obscure circumstances because it was feared that the
registration requirements of the new Act might jeopardize the se-
curity of corporation debenture financing which, in Ontario,
amounts to many millions of dollars annually. To meet these ob-
jections the committee of the Canadian Bar Association suggested
some compromise proposals which were adopted in the Model
Act.69 Hopefully they will also be incorporated in a future revision
of the Ontario Act. If they are not, some baffling problems of pri-
ority will arise between corporate and noncorporate forms of chat-
tel security.
Wittingly or otherwise, the Ontario Act fell heir to a number of
other uncertainties which also afflict Article 9. The status of the
English-style floating charge is one striking example. 70  Under-
standably Article 9 did not concern itself with this congeries of
problems because the English concept was never adopted in the
United States. The Ontario omission is less comprehendable be-
cause floating charge financing i l'anglais is a familiar phenomenon.
Here again the Canadian Bar Association committee rushed in
where angels fear to tread with a number of specific proposals,7"
but its efforts were rebuffed.72 Wiser heads apparently thought
that the position was tolerably clear or, at any rate, that it was
better to leave the issue to judicial resolution than to attempt a
premature statutory formulation of the answers. The uncertainty
surrounding the status of equipment leases will be even more fa-
miliar to you than to us. I regret to say that so far the Ontario
Act has been no more successful in finding a simple solution than
67. Id. § 24.
68. Id. c. 88 (1970).
69. COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITY ACT, CANADIAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, DRAFT UNIFORM PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITY ACT vii-iX
(Aug. 1969 Draft) [hereafter cited as Draft UPPSA]; COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM
PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITY ACT, CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL
UNIFORM PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITY ACT §§ l(ee), 46(2), 53(2) (1970) [here-
after cited as Model UPPSA].
70. Cf Abel, Has Article 9 Scuttled the Floating Charge?, in ASPECTS OF
COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL LAW ch. 27 (J. S. Ziegel & W. F. Foster eds. 1969).
71. Draft UPPSA at x, §§ 9(2), 12(2), 25 (1)(e), 55(2a) & 55(11).
72. Model UPPSA at iii-iv.
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was the Article 9 Review Committee. Indeed, the Ontario Act
does not even provide the limited guidance afforded by section
1-201(37) of the Code.7 3  The CBA committee recommended7 4
that equipment leases running for more than a year should be sub-
ject to perfection requirements but this suggestion, too, still awaits
implementation."
After this very incomplete catalogue of deficiencies in the On-
tario Act, allow me to draw attention to some of its more positive
virtues. The difficult distinction in Article 9 between contract
rights, accounts, and other intangibles was never adopted. Instead
section 5 simply provides that the validity and the perfection of a
security interest in intangibles shall be governed by the law of the
jurisdiction in which the debtor has his chief place of business.7 6
"Intangibles" is defined negatively in section 1(m) as meaning all
personal property, including choses in action, that is not goods,
chattel paper, documents of title, instruments, or securities.
77
It will be noted that in striving for simplicity of treatment in this
area the Ontario Act anticipated the 1972 amendments to Article 9.
Canadian law has also benefitted from the vigorous discussions
which preceded the adoption of the report of the Article 9 Review
Committee with respect to the respective merits of the priorities
of accounts receivable and inventory financers. Section 34(2) of
the Ontario Act decides the issue squarely in favour of the inven-
tory financer.7 8  The CBA committee adopted a less draconian
73. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE [UCC] § 1-201(37) provides inter alia that:
Unless a lease or consignment is intended as security, reservation of title
thereunder is not a "security interest" but a consignment is in any event
subject to the provisions on consignment sales (section 2-326). Whether
a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the facts of each case;
however, (a) the inclusion of an option to purchase does not of itself make
the lease one intended for security, and (b) an agreement that upon com-
pliance with the terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has the option
to become the owner of the property for no additional consideration or for
a nominal consideration does make the lease one intended for security.
74. Draft UPPSA at x, & §§ 1(y), 2.
75. The Uniformity Commissioners were opposed to the suggestion, and the
CBA Committee did not wish to jeopardize the prospects for the adoption of the
Model UPPSA. The change was therefore deleted in the final version. See
Model UPPSA at iii.
76. ONT. REv. STAT. c. 344, § 5 (1970).
77. Id. § 1(m).
78. The Act currently provides:
A purchase-money security interest in inventory or its proceeds has
priority over any other security interest in the same collateral,
(a) if the purchase-money security interest was perfected at the time the
debtor received possession of the collateral; and
(b) if any secured party whose security interest was actually known to
the holder of the purchase-money security interest or who, prior to the
registration by the holder of the purchase-money security interest,
19761
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view and incorporated a compromise solution which, once again,
bears a striking resemblance to the revised version of UCC
9-312(4). Section 34(2) of the Model UPPSA provides that "a
security interest in proceeds shall not have priority over a security
interest in accounts given for new value where a financing state-
ment relating thereto has been registered before the purchase money
security interest in inventory was perfected or a financing state-
ment relating thereto was registered. 79
I have given you a very inadequate account of the differences
between the Ontario Act and Article 9 and I have said very little
about the variations in the Model Act and the Manitoba version.
It may seem surprising that a piece of legislation as complex and
technical as Article 9 could have been transplanted to northern soil
with so little apparent difficulty. I have already supplied one clue
to explain the easy transition-the congeniality to Canadian eyes of
the basic conceptual framework of Article 9. But honesty also
compels me to admit the importance of another factor. The num-
ber of Canadian specialists in chattel security law is much smaller
than in the U.S. Many of the individual rules in Article 9 could
have been challenged on policy grounds but were adopted largely
by default because the resources and time simply were not available
for an in-depth examination of every section. It would be a mis-
take, however, to take for granted the continuing essential uniform-
ity of the two laws. Conceivably after Ontario lawyers have had
time to absorb the practical implications of some of the new rules
there may be pressure for a greater number of changes.
B. Article 2
The ready adaptability of Article 9 to Canadian conditions may
suggest an easy replication of the earlier success in the case of
Article 2. The preliminary signs appear indeed very favourable.
All the common law provinces have adopted almost verbatim the
Imperial Sale of Goods Act of 189380 and remarkably few changes
had registered a financing statement in the prescribed form covering
the same items or type of inventory, had received notification of the
purchase-money security interest before the debtor received posses-
sion of the collateral covered by the purchase-money security interest;
and
(c) if such notification states that the person giving the notice had or ex-
pected to acquire a purchase-money security interest in inventory of
the debtor, describing such inventory by item or type.
Id. § 34(2).
79. Model UPPSA § 34(2).
80. CCH CANADIAN LTD., CANADIAN SALES AND CREDIT LAW GUIDE
(2 vols., loose leaf service).
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have been made since then to the parent Act or its offspring.81
Such changes as have been made in Canada principally affect con-
sumer sales.82 The Imperial Act was deficient in a number of im-
portant respects when it was first adopted and the intervening
years have accentuated the defects and enlarged the gulf separat-
ing 19th century sales practices and distributive patterns from those
obtaining at the present day.8 3  On grounds of modernity alone,
therefore, Article 2 would have great appeal.
But there are formidable difficulties. The sheer length of the
more than one hundred sections in Article 2 look forbidding when
compared to the economy and tight language of the 57 sections of
the Ontario Act, but this is a difference that can readily be justi-
fied in terms of the expanded scope of Article 2 and its much more
detailed provisions. There is a more significant difficulty. Article 9
proceeds from a single powerful concept. Article 2 does not lend
itself to this simple generalization. Admittedly it contains such per-
vasive concepts as commercial good faith and unconscionability
84
but these provide no structural framework and only limited as-
sistance in the solution of specific problems. It therefore be-
hooves the foreign observer to work his way systematically through
every section of Article 2 and to appraise its merits against the
background of his own legal system and the value judgments to
which he has become accustomed.
The research team of the Ontario Law Reform Commission
has submitted Article 2 to this type of scrutiny and we have found
numerous instances in which the Code solution seemed of doubt-
ful value in the Canadian context. In some vital areas the Code
solution was already dated; in a number of others none was prof-
fered. Ambiguities abound and sometimes the generally excellent
comments fail to explain the reasons for significant changes in the
prior law. Permit me to select a few examples at random. The
United Kingdom repealed the Statute of Frauds provisions in the
British Sale of Goods Act as long ago as 1954.85 At least one prov-
81. See "Table of Concordance between the Imperial and Canadian Acts," in
G. H. L. FRIDMAN, SALE OF GOODS IN CANADA xlii-liii (1973) [hereafter cited as
FRIDMAN].
82. See, e.g., The Consumer Protection Act, ONT. REV. STAT. c. 82 (1970);
The Government Reorganization Act of 1972, c. 1, § 35 (Ont.), The Consumer
Protection Amendment Act of 1972, c. 53 (Ont.); cf. ONTARIO LAW REFORM COM-
MISSION, REPORT ON CONSUMER WARRANTIES AND GUARANTEES IN THE SALE OF
GOODS (1972) [hereafter cited as WARRANTIES REPORT].
83. See FRIDMAN 443-49; WARRANTIES REPORT 65-69.
84. UCC §§ 2-103(1)(b), 2-302.
85. Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act of 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, c. 34,
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86ince (British Columbia) has followed suit in Canada. Does it
make sense for a revised Ontario Sales Act to enact the modified
Statute of Frauds provisions in UCC 2-201 or should Ontario be
guided by British experience? A still more difficult problem con-
fronts the Canadian reformer with respect to the other formational
rules in Part 2 of Article 2. Some basic elements of Canadian con-
tract law are badly in need of revision, particularly those involving
the law of consideration. Provisions such as those in UCC sections
2-205, 2-206, and 2-209 greatly appeal but should they be con-
fined to sales law? And has the "battle of the forms" conundrum
really found its quietus in section 2-207?
Consider also the most contentious area of sales law, the pro-
visions concerning the law of warranties. Canada is still a long way
from adopting a doctrine of strict liability in tort for defectively
manufactured goods, 7 but if we were minded to pursue this line
of reform a provision like section 402A in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts would surely provide a cleaner solution than the various
versions of section 2-318. 88 A modem sales act ought also to state
86. See B.C. REV. STAT. c. 344, § 10 (1960) (permitting contracts made under
the British Columbia Sale of Goods Act to be either written or oral).
87. Cf S. M. WADDAMS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 117-20, 229-34 (1974).
88. Section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides three alternative
theories of liability of manufacturers of defective goods toward third parties not
in privity to the contract. The intent of the draftsmen of the Code was to allow
each state to select one of the alternatives, depending on the development of the
state's case law on the issue. The three versions are as follows:
Alternative A
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in
his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume
or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the war-
ranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative B
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural per-
son who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by
the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A
seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative C
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person
who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the
goods and who is injured by breach of the warranty. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section with respect to injury to the
person of an individual to whom the warranty extends. ...
UCC § 2-318 (1972 version).
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides for strict liability
in tort for injuries resulting from defectively manufactured goods. It is analogous
to alternative C of UCC section 2-318, since it provides a remedy not only for
injuries to the person, but also for injuries to property. Section 402A states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if
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much more explicitly than does the Code the liability of a manu-
facturer or other seller not in privity with the ultimate buyer for
breach of express and implied warranties only resulting in economic
losses. Perhaps the generally accepted American theory of the hy-
brid origins of the binding character of an express warranty89 is
sufficient (but surely only partially sufficient) to bridge the gap south
of the border. Anglo-Canadian law, however, has long been
wedded to the contractual nature of a warranty" and express lan-
guage would be needed to change so fundamental a concept in the
Canadian pantheon.
Consider also the perfect tender rule in section 2-601. In view
of the frequent criticism which has been directed against the rule,
it seems surprising that it should have been retained in the Code
as the dominant leitmotif of the buyer's remedies with respect to a
defective tender. Of course, the rigours of the common law rule
have been relaxed by allowing the seller a right to cure9' and by
refusing to allow the buyer to revoke his acceptance unless there
has been a substantial impairment of value.92 But would it not
have been better to start with a substantial impairment test as the
basis of the right of rejection in all cases and to confer on the
buyer a right to demand cure in appropriate circumstances for lesser
breaches as is done in the Uniform Law for the International
Sale of Goods? 93 At least from the point of view of a jurisdiction
considering the adoption of Article 2 the alternatives deserve care-
ful scrutiny even if in the end no superior solution can be found
to an apparently intractable problem.
I have intentionally seized upon some of the more controver-
sial aspects of Article 2, not in order to deny its very real achieve-
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substan-
tial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
89. Cf. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
90. This is especially true since attempts to apply a simple injurious reliance
test were rebuffed by the House of Lords in Heilbut, Symons & Co. v. Buckleton,
[1913] A.C. 30.
91. UCC § 2-508.
92. UCC § 2-608.
93. Article 44. The Uniform Act is in the final phases of revision by the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), but the principle
of Article 44.1 appears to have been retained. See Report of the Working Group
on the International Sale of Goods on the Work of its Sixth Session 9-10, arts.
29-30, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/100 (1975).
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ments but to illustrate that, unlike Article 9, it is not a monolithic
structure. The prospective adopting jurisdiction can borrow gener-
ously from the rich lodestone of ideas without feeling that by re-
jecting others it is destroying a carefully orchestrated plan. It
must be admitted, however, that this is not the only option. For a
young country with a small population and limited intellectual re-
sources there are immense attractions in copying a powerful neigh-
bour's master plan without even the price of a license fee. And
moreover, at a stroke of the pen, uniformity can be achieved be-
tween two of the world's closest trading partners. This ought surely
to weight heavily in the balance.
Curiously the business community itself appears to be indif-
ferent. As part of its programme of empirical studies the research
team of the Ontario Law Reform Commission surveyed the mem-
bers of the Ontario branch of the Canadian Manufacturers' Asso-
ciation. 94 The team also distributed a legal questionnaire to a rep-
resentative number of trade associations. The results revealed no
strident complaints about the existing dichotomy of commercial
laws between Ontario and the U.S. and no passionate longing for
international uniformity.9" Presumably the apparent contentment
with the status quo reflects the businessman's feelings that in-
telligent cooperation, good faith in commercial dealings and, above
all, freedom to shape agreements according to individual needs, are
more important than interesting intellectual structures.
96
C. The other Articles of the Code
Somewhat different considerations enter into the question which
of the other Articles of the Code lend themselves to ready adop-
tion in Canada. I have already mentioned97 the reproduction of
Article 8 in the Ontario Business Corporations Act and the Canada
Business Corporations Act. This transplant occurred because of a
recommendation made in a 1967 report by the Select Committee
94. As of November 1975 the statistical findings had not been made public,
but they are expected to be released in due course.
95. Many of those responding to the survey were apparently not aware of
UNCITRAL's work in the sales field, and it may be safely assumed that knowledge
about the important differences between Article 2 and the provincial Sale of Goods
acts is not much greater among Canadian manufacturers.
96. These findings are not novel; American investigators have encountered
similar reactions. See, e.g., Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 55 (1963); Macaulay, The Use
and Non-Use of Contracts in the Manufacturing Industry, 9 PRAC. LAW. 13
(1963).
97. See notes 49, 50 supra and accompanying text.
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on Company Law of the Ontario Legislative Assembly.9 Prior
provincial law concerning the rights and duties of issuers, transfer
agents and purchasers of corporate securities was fragmentary and
largely of common law origin. 99 It was therefore no doubt useful
to update the rules and place them in a coherent statutory frame-
work. Ontario's version of Article 8 is incomplete and some ob-
servers have complained that some of the key provisions in Article 8
have been emasculated.'0° The judgment is probably a little too
harsh. It is true, however, that the Ontario provisions were adopted
with little discussion and apparent indifference by most members
of the Bar. Some practising lawyers claim that they do not fully
understand them, an admission which can be viewed as an atypi-
cal example of forensic modesty. What appears to be generally
conceded is that the Article 8 provisions in the Ontario Act have
made no practical difference to the daily operations of the Ontario
securities market.
An even stronger case can be made for the adoption by the
provinces and the federal government of an Article 7 type law on
documents of title. The present position is manifestly unsatisfac-
tory. The Canadian federal law consists of an antiquated Bills of
Lading Act,'0 1 copied almost verbatim from the British Act of
1855,102 and of scattered provisions in various transportation and
grain acts.'.0 The provincial laws are a little more recent. Six
provincesl°4 have enacted the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act
98. SELECT COMM. ON COMPANY LAW, ONTARIO LEGIS. ASSEMBLY, INTERIM
REPORT ch. VI (1967).
99. Ziegel, The New Look in Canadian Corporation Laws, in 2 STUDIES IN
CANADIAN COMPANY LAW 26-27 (J. Ziegel ed. 1973).
100. Id. at 28. The most damaging omissions have occurred in the-adoption
of Article 8 definitions. The Ontario Business Corporations Act of 1970 did not
include the Article 8 definitions of "purchaser," "purchaser for value," "genuine,"
"unauthorized," and "noted conspicuously." ONT. REV. STAT. c. 53 (1970). A
1971 amendment added the last three definitions to the Act, but "purchaser" and
"purchaser for value," two extremely important definitions, are still missing from
the Act. See The Business Corporations Amendment Act 1971, c. 26, § 16 (Ont.
1971).
The definition of "security" in the Ontario Act is also significantly different
from that found in Article 8. Compare ONT. REV. STAT. c. 53, § 63(l)(i) (1970)
with UCC § 8-102(1)(a).
101. CAN. REv. STAT. c. B-6 (1970).
102. The Bills of Lading Act of 1855, 18 & 19 Vict., c. 111.
103. CAN. REV. STAT. c. C-14, sched. 1, c. C-15, c. G-16, §§ 127-30 (1970).
See also General Orders T. 5 (Feb. 1, 1965) and T. 909 (Dec. 9, 1964) adopted
by the railway commissioners under the former Railway Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c.
271 (1966-67), now superseded by the Transport Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. T-14
(1970).
104. UNIFORM LAW CONFERENCE OF CANADA, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 56TH
ANNUAL MEETING 234 (1974).
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first adopted by the Canadian Uniformity Commissioners in
1945,105 but there remains the not inconsiderable difficulty that its
provisions overlap and conflict with sections in the earlier adopted
provincial Sale of Goods, Factors, and Mercantile Law Amend-
ment legislation. 10 6  Despite this fact, there is no concerted pres-
sure to adopt a more coherent and consistent body of law based on
Article 7.
Article 6 can, I think, be disposed of quickly. A Uniform Bulk
Sales Act was adopted by the Uniformity Commissioners in 1920107
and substantially revised in 1960.108 One or the other version is
in force in a majority of the common law provinces and territories.'0 9
The revised Act differs substantially from Article 6, but even if the
provinces suddenly discovered an irresistible passion for the Uni-
form Commercial Code, I doubt that they would place the harmoni-
zation of the existing law and the Code version high on their list
of priorities. The effort simply would not generate enough sex ap-
peal.
This brings me, with almost indecent haste, to Articles 3, 4 and
5, or what I may loosely call the banker's corner. The Canadian
Bills of Exchange Act, 110 a federal emanation, is a close copy of
the British prototype of 1882 and dates from 1890."' It has been
amended only slightly since and would appear to be eminently ripe
for revision. Yet, as a Toronto scholar noted a few years ago,
there is barely a whisper of support for such a step.' 2 Dr. Falcon-
bridge, the former dean of the Osgoode Hall Law School and a
distinguished Canadian authority on negotiable instruments law,
catalogued many years ago a list of the defects in the then Canadian
Act and urged correction, 1 3 but his effort met with no success.
105. CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORMITY OF LEGISLATION IN
CANADA 22-23, 179 (1945).
106. See, e.g., ONT. REV. STAT. C. 156, §§ 2, 3, 8; c. 272, §§ 7-9, 14; c. 421, §§ 25,
45 (1970).
107. CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORMITY OF LEGISLATION IN
CANADA 9 (1920).
108. Id. at 31, 120-40 (1960). For a critical analysis of the original Ontario Bulk
Sales Act and a comment on the 1960 revised version of the Act, see Catzman,
The Bulk Sales Act (Ontario), I CAN. B.J. 38 (1958); Catzman, The Bulk Sales
Act (Ontario), 3 CAN. B.J. 28 (1960).
109. Viz., Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland,
Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, the Northwest Territories, and the Yukon.
See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 104, at 231.
110. CAN. REV. STAT. c. B-5 (1970).
111. CAN. STAT. c. 33 (1890). See also J. FALCONBRIDGE, THE LAW OF
BANKS AND BANKING ch. 36 (6th ed. 1956).
112. Abel, Canadian Commercial Law, 17 BUFF. L. REV. 5, 7-8 (1967).
113. JOHN D. FALCONBRIDGE, THE LAW OF BANKS AND BANKING vi-viii (4th
ed. 1928).
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Other qualified observers have remarked on the technical and styl-
istic superiority of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law
1 4
and no doubt the same could be said of Article 3. Whatever
interest there may be in a general overhaul of the Canadian Act
arises from the expected impact of an electronic funds transfer
payment system.15
It seems to me that the surprising acquiescence in the status
quo is largely explicable in terms of the Canadian banking system.
Whatever common origins our two systems may have had," 6 they
have long ago parted company. Canada has only one banking
law, the federal one,"i7 and from the beginning of Confederation it
has permitted branch banking." 8 Inevitably, therefore, the histor-
ical trend has favoured bank mergers and the concentration of
banking business in the hands of a small number of powerful banks.
Today Canada only has eleven banks, five of which accounted in
1968 for 93 percent of all chartered bank assets. 9 Compare this
miniscule number with the approximately 14,000 banks in the
U.S. 2° and it will be readily understood not only why there is so
little pressure for a revised Bills of Exchange Act, but also why
most aspects of the private law of Canadian banking remain un-
codified. This includes the law of deposits and collections and
equally of letters of credit. So far as letters of credit are concerned,
there is also another reason. Documentary letters of credit in
Canada are used almost exclusively in connection with interna-
tional transactions and retaining international uniformity, as re-
flected in the Uniform Customs and Practices of the International
Chamber of Commerce, is no doubt more important than uni-
formity with respect to the modest amount of letters of credit fi-
nancing conducted at the domestic level.
The reader may now feel depressed. After ascending the lofty
heights of Article 9 and noting its encouraging impact on the adop-
tion of progressive legislation in Canada, we have gradually drifted
114. JOHN D. FALCONBRIDGE, THE LAW OF BANKS AND BANKING 490 (5th
ed. 1935).
115. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, THE CANADIAN PAYMENT
SYSTEM AND THE COMPUTER: IssUES FOR LAW REFORM (Ottawa 1974).
116. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
117. CAN. REV. STAT. c. B-I (1970). The Act is revised decennially and the
next revision is due in 1977.
118. See id. § 75(I)(a) (1970). For the importance of branch banking in the
evolution of the Canadian banking system, see A. B. JAMIESON, CHARTERED BANK-
ING IN CANADA 161 (1962).
119. J. GALBRAITH, CANADIAN BANKING 14 (1970).
120. Redford, Dual Banking: A Case Study in Federalism, 31 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 749, 755 (1966) (Table I).
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downwards. Like American foreign policy, good intentions are
meeting with successive rebuffs. We saw that Article 8 has found a
Canadian home but without any marked enthusiasm on the part of
its hosts. Article 7 deserves to be treated at least as favourably
but is still awaiting a Canadian sponsor. Of the remaining articles
only one, Article 2, is likely to make a significant impact in the
foreseeable future and then probably only in a much modified
form. If one can draw a moral from this variegated tale, it is
that Canadians are most receptive to legal imports when domestic
law supplies no answers to newly emerging problems or when exist-
ing answers prove to be seriously inadequate in the face of chang-
ing conditions. This was true in the case of Article 9 and partly
true in the case of Article 8. It should also apply, though perhaps
with no strong sense of urgency, to Articles 2 and 7. The other
articles, I fear, are likely to remain outside the charmed circle for
an indefinite period of time.
IV. THE LESSONS OF CONSUMER CREDIT
Canadian receptiveness to American precedents when answers
are being sought to new problems is amply demonstrated in the
field of consumer credit. In common with American experience,
the volume of outstanding consumer credit in Canada has grown
prodigiously, from a modest $870 million in 1948 to an astonishing
$20 billion at the end of 1974.121 The sources and types of con-
sumer credit have also multiplied generously and in Canada, as in
the United States, consumer credit has become an accepted way
of life.
Unhappily, the problems, legal and social, have also grown
apace. It would require a lengthy paper to describe adequately
the Canadian responses and I will therefore limit myself to illus-
trating the importance of the American influence in a number of
representative areas.
As I have previously mentioned, the Canadian federal Small
Loans Act 122 is largely an American borrowing. It has served us
well but it is beginning to show the signs of its age and the federal
government has promised an early overhaul. If I read my tea leaves
correctly the most contentious issue is likely to revolve around the
retention of the concept of a regulated interest ceiling. Our pres-
ent Act uses a graduated step rate. 123 As is well known, the Na-
121. CAN. STATIS. REV. § 10 (May 1975) (Table 6).
122. CAN. REV. STAT. C. S-ll (1970).
123. Id. §§ 3, 14.
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tional Commission on Consumer Finance124 was divided on the is-
sue and influential financial economists seriously question the wis-
dom of regulated ceilings. Conceivably the debate may be even
more intense in Canada than it is in the U.S. because with us
restrictions on the imposition of interest charges are the exception
rather than the rule.
125
Furious controversy also marked the introduction in Canada of
proposals for truth-in-lending laws. 126  Here the interacting influ-
ence of legislative initiatives was particularly noticeable. Your
founding crusading warrior was Senator Douglas; by a happy co-
incidence his opposite number in Canada was also a senator, Sena-
tor Croll. In Canada, however, the first accolade of success was
bestowed on the provinces because two of them, Ontario and Nova
Scotia, 127 adopted truth-in-lending requirements before the Cana-
dian government did128 and indeed before the requirement became
fashionable in the United States. Is it conceivable that news of
the northern mischief may have swayed the legislative debates be-
low the border?
Holder in due course problems and freedom from defences
arising out of the use of consumer notes and cut-off clauses are
familiar problems on both sides of the border. Here too our re-
spective jurisdictions display a striking parallel of judicially evolved
doctrines and legislatively enshrined solutions. Until the seminal
decision in 1962 of Mr. Justice Kelly of the Ontario Court of Ap-
peal in Federal Discount Corp. v. St. Pierre,129 finance companies
sailed serenely through the increasingly troubled waters with the aid
of an earlier decision of the Supreme Court of Canada. 130  In what
for Canada was a bold stroke of judicial creativity, Mr. Justice Kelly
denied holder in due course status to a finance company which had
an intimate relationship with the seller and, as the judge found, was
124. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN
THE UNITED STATES ch. 6-7, 220-30 (1972) (dissenting statement of Sen. Prox-
mire).
125. The Federal Interest Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 1-18, § 2 (1970), states the
basic postulate that, unless otherwise provided, the lender is free to bargain for
any rate of interest that may be agreed upon. The regulation of interest rates
is primarily a federal responsibility.
126. J. S. ZIEGEL & R. E. OLLEY, CONSUMER CREDIT IN CANADA, ch. 7 (1966).
127. Consumer Protection Act, ONT. STAT. c. 23, §§ 21-23 (1966); Consumer Pro-
tection Act, N.S. REV. STAT. c. 5 (1966).
128. CAN. STAT. c. 87, §§ 91, 92 (1966-67); CAN. REV. STAT. c. B-i, §§ 91-92
(1970); [1967] CAN. STAT. ORDERS & REGS. 67-504.
129. 32 D.L.R. 2d 86 (1962), noted in 40 CAN. B. REV. 461 (1962).
130. Killoran v. Monticello State Bank, 57 O.L.R. 359 (1921), distinguished in
Corp. de Finance BelvEdre v. Range, 5 D.L.R. 3d 257 (1969), noted in 48 CAN.
B. REV. 309 (1970).
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fully privy to its sales methods. In justifying his decision he relied
on a line of well-known American cases13 ' which had also adopted
the joint venture theory. For good measure, he added the heretical
view that the law of negotiable instruments was merchant's law and
was never intended to intrude into the regulation of domestic trans-
actions.
Other Canadian courts were quick to follow Mr. Justice Kelly's
lead and the blows against the finance companies' previously im-
pregnable position came thick and fast. In Beneficial Finance Co.
of Canada v. Kulig132 the Federal Discount doctrine was applied
to a purchase money loan transaction where the lender and vendor
stood in a symbiotic relationship. Concurrently with these judi-
cial developments a dual legislative attack was launched at the
federal and provincial levels. The provinces nullified the effect
of disclaimer clauses in consumer sales transactions133 while the
federal government added in 1970 a new Part V to the Bills of
Exchange Act.'3 4 This requires all consumer notes, including post-
dated cheques, given in respect of a consumer purchase to be
marked "Consumer Purchase" and provides that the holder of such
an instrument takes it subject to the purchaser's defences and rights
of set-off. 35 The new provisions also extend to instruments given
in respect of a purchase money loan where the seller and lender
were not acting at arm's length to each other. 36  None of these
developments will strike the American ear as very revolutionary.
They were in fact foreshadowed by successive drafts of the Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code137 and individual action by numerous
state legislatures. What is significant is that collective action was
taken in Canada at a time when the Code's sponsors were still
agonizing about the merits of abolishing entirely the holder in due
course doctrine in consumer credit transactions.
Restrictions on creditor's remedies have likewise been the focus
of increasing legislative activity at the provincial level in Canada,
38
131. Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940);
Taylor v. Atlas Security Co., 213 Mo. App. 282, 249 S.W. 746 (1923); Buffalo Indus.
Bank v. De Marzio, 162 Misc. 742, 296 N.Y.S. 783 (Buffalo City Ct. 1937).
132. 13 D.L.R. 3d 134 (1970).
133. See, e.g., The Consumer Protection Act, ONT. REV. STAT. c. 82, § 42 (1970),
as amended, ONT. STAT. c. 24, § 1(1) (1971).
134. CAN. REV. STAT. c. 48 (1970). See generally Ziegel, Canada Regulates
Consumer Notes, 26 Bus. LAW. 1455 (1971).
135. CAN. REV. STAT. c. 48, §§ 190(1), 191 (1970).
136. Id. § 189(3).
137. See UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 2.403, 2.404 (Draft 1968).
138. See Cuming, Protection of Consumer-Borrowers-Limitations on the Rem-
edies of Consumers-Lenders, 33 SASK. L. REV. 58 (1968); Ziegel, Recent Develop-
ments in Canadian Consumer Credit Law, 36 MOD. L. REv. 479 passim (1973).
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but here it is much more difficult to determine the extent of Amer-
ican influence. A sue or seize rule was adopted in Alberta as
early as 1942139 and now obtains in a majority of the provinces.1 40
Wage assignments were outlawed in Ontario in 1968141 and this
precedent is likely to be copied by the other provinces in the fore-
seeable future to the extent that it has not already happened.
Ontario was also a leader in imposing substantial restrictions on
wage garnishments. The provincial Wages Act 142 exempts 70 per-
cent of the debtor's salary from garnishment and allows a judge,
on the debtor's application, to grant total exemption. 43 One can
detect here the reciprocating influence of scholarly writings and
public agitation in both the United States and Canada. It seems
surprising, however, that neither country appears so far to have
followed the simple solution enshrined in the British Attachment of
Earnings Act of 1971.144 That Act allows wages to be attached
only after individual provision has been made for a "protected
earnings rate" which is based not on some arbitrary amount but on
the court's assessment of the debtor's resources and actital needs.1
45
What of the debtor who is so overcommitted that he needs
greater assistance than relief from garnishment? The Canadian re-
sponse has been a little slower than the American one but we have
been catching up rapidly. As early as 1932 Manitoba adopted an
Orderly Payments of Debts Act 146 which was basically a statutory
prorating plan which enabled the debtor to consolidate his debts
and pay them in approved instalments over a period of time not
exceeding three years. Alberta adopted an almost identical mea-
sure in 1959147 but this was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court of Canada in a 1960 decision 48 on the grounds that it
trenched on the exclusive federal bankruptcy jurisdiction. The fed-
eral government responded to this turn of events by re-enacting
139. ALTA. STAT. c. 52, § 2 (1942).
140. For example, British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, Quebec, and New-
foundland. Saskatchewan law goes further and restricts the seller's remedy to
repossession and realization of his security interest. SASK. REV. STAT. C. 103,
§ 18 (1965), as amended, SASK. STAT. c. 57, § 2 (1973).
141. ONT. STAT. C. 142, § 7 (1968). Wage assignments to credit unions are ex-
cepted. The prohibition was recommended in. the SELECT COMMITTEE, ONTARIO
LEGISLATURE, FINAL REPORT ON CONSUMER CREDIT 308 (1965).
142. ONT. REV. STAT. c. 486, § 7 (1970).
143. Id.
144. C. 32 (U.K.).
145. Id. §§ 6(5), 14.
146. MAN. STAT. c. 34 (1932).
147. Validity of the Orderly Payment of Debts Act, ALTA. STAT. c. 61 (1959).
148. In re Validity of the Orderly Payment of Debts Act, 1959 (Alta), c. 61,
23 D.L.R. 2d 449 (1960).
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the provincial legislation in the form of a new Part in the federal
Bankruptcy Act. 14 9 The new provisions do not apply in any prov-
ince unless the provincial authorities have requested it and several
provinces still have to make the election. It is anticipated, how-
ever, that the pending revision of the Bankruptcy Act 50 will elimi-
nate the optional feature and make the wage earner receivership
provisions uniformly available across the country.
This was one of a number of important recommendations af-
fecting insolvent consumers made in 1970 by a Canadian federal
task force on bankruptcy and insolvency legislation.1 5 1 Its report
also envisaged a simplified form of bankruptcy for those consumers
who do not wish to avail themselves of a prorating plan or are
hopelessly insolvent. Consumer and nonbusiness bankruptcies in
Canada numbered only 3,086 in 1972 or about 2 percent of the
corresponding American figure. 5 2  The striking difference can be
explained, at least in part, by the stigma which still attaches in
Canada to a bankruptcy order and to the high cost of retaining the
services of a private trustee in bankruptcy. Under a programme
initiated in 1972 the Canadian federal Department of Consumer
and Corporate Affairs makes available for a nominal fee the ser-
vices of a public trustee but this facility is restricted to indigent
consumers who can satisfy a fairly stringent means test. In 1972
the federal trustees rejected 675 applications out of a total of
1,446.151 It is not clear to what extent the revised Bankruptcy Act
will remedy this defect in the delivery of legal services.
Let me conclude these discursive remarks on a more cheerful
note. As I have touched base with some of the salient problems
in modern consumer credit law the thought must surely have leapt
to the reader's mind, "Why don't those guys adopt our Uniform
Consumer Credit Code?" An intriguing question, to be sure, but
one which calls for a lecture of its own!
149. CAN. STAT. c. 32, § 22 (1966-67), CAN. REV. STAT. c. B-3, Part X, §§ 188-
213 (1970).
150. See Bill C-60, 30th Pan., 1st Sess., Part III, §§ 63 et seq. (1975).
151. STUDY COMMITTEE ON BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY LEGISLATION, RE-
PORT, pt. III, ch. 7 (1970).
152. SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKRUPTCY, REPORT FOR THE YEAR ENDED
MARCH 31, 1973, at 17 (Table G-2). Nonbusiness bankruptcies in the United
States totaled 164,737. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRO-
CEEDINGs 240 (1972) (Table 75).
153. SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKRUPTCY, REPORT, supra note 152, at 40-41.
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